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Rex R. Schultze*
Evolution and Creation Science
in Your School: "The Monkey
Business Continues. . . ."
"It took God only six days to create the universe - it's gonna take the court
two weeks to decide if it should be taught."1
THE "GENESIS" (pun intended)
In March of 1925, the state of Tennessee enacted a law that made
it
unlawful for any teacher in any of the universities, normals or other public
schools of the State, which are supported in whole or in part by the public
school funds of the State, to teach any theory that denies the story of divine
creation of man as taught in the Bible, and to teach instead that man has
descended from a lower order of animals. 2
Shortly thereafter, George Rappelyea, a mining engineer, had a
conversation with Thomas Scopes, a twenty-four year old science
teacher in Dayton, Tennessee. The conversation involved the new an-
tievolution law; specifically, Rappelyea suggested that Scopes teach
the forbidden subject to his biology class, thereby securing for Dayton
the honor of being the first test case. Scopes agreed. By arrangement,
he taught evolution to his class, his friends told the authorities and
Scopes was indicted.3
News of the "monkey trial" spread rapidly throughout the country.
William Jennings Bryan volunteered to assist the prosecution headed
by Attorney General E.T. Stewart. Bryan, as informal head of the fun-
damentalist movement, had traveled throughout the south urging the
adoption of antievolution laws. His offer was enthusiastically ac-
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1. Statement by an anonymous observer at the Arkansas creation-evolution trial.
D. NELUN, THE CREATION CONTROVERSY - SCIENCE OR SCRIIPTURE IN THE SCHOOLS
137 (1982).
2. 3 CLAsSICS OF THE COURTROOM, Clarence Darrow's Cross-Examination of William
Jennings Bryan in Tennessee v. John Scopes, at i (1987).
3. See id.
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cepted. The ACLU took up Scopes's defense and had its own volun-
teer, Clarence Darrow.4
The trial began on July 10, 1925. Toward the end of the trial, after
Bryan had offered himself as an expert witness, the judge presiding
over the case allowed Darrow to cross-examine Bryan on his qualifica-
tions outside the presence of the jury. The jurors were the only ones to
miss it, as the whole world heard the show by telegraph.5 The point of
Bryan's willingness to testify, and Darrow's presence at the trial were
summed up by the participants in the following exchange:
General Stewart: I want to interpose another objection. What is the purpose
of this examination?
Mr. Bryan: The purpose is to cast ridicule on everybody who believes in the
Bible, and I am perfectly willing that the world shall know that these gentle-
men have no other purpose than ridiculing every Christian who believes in
the Bible.
Mr. Darrow: We have the purpose of preventing bigots and ignoramuses from
controlling the education of the United States and you know it, and that is
all.6
The trial ended in Scopes's conviction and a fine, but was later re-
versed by the Tennessee Supreme Court on a legal technicality.7 The
Court did, however, uphold the authority of the state to regulate the
public school curriculum, stating that if the Legislature thinks that
"the cause of education and the study of science generally will be pro-
moted by forbidding the teaching of evolution in the schools of the
state, we can conceive of no grounds to justify the court's
interference."8
THE "EXODUS"
The exodus of the theory of evolution through legislation and the
courts over the seventy-five years since the Scopes trial has had at
least two distinct stages: the prohibition stage and the equal treat-
ment stage.9 The issue now appears to be heading into a third stage
involving various collateral attacks on the teaching of the theory of
evolution in America's classrooms.
4. See id. at ii. This was the only instance in which Clarence Darrow ever volun-
teered his services.
5. See id.
6. Id. at 39-40. A complete reading of the famous cross-examination reveals that
Bryan was not the strict fundamentalist insisting on a literal reading of the Bi-
ble; and stated that a "day" may have been "600,000,000 years."
7. See Scopes v. State, 289 S.W. 363, 366 (1927).
8. Id.
9. See Eugene C. Bjorklun, Ed.D., Evolution and Creationism in the Public School
Curriculum: The Academic Freedom Issue, 70 WEsT's EDUC. LAw REP. 277, 278
(1992).
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STAGE 1 - Prohibition
The first stage involved legislative prohibitions against teaching
evolution. Between 1921 and 1929 fundamentalists introduced anti-
evolution bills into twenty state legislatures. States such as Missis-
sippi, Arkansas, Florida, and Texas passed such legislation.iO Under
the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision in Scopes, it was presumably
legal to ban teaching the theory of evolution in public schools.1
In 1928, the Arkansas Legislature enacted a statute making it un-
lawful for a teacher in any state-supported school or university "to
teach the theory or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from
a lower order of animals."i 2 Violation of the statute was a misde-
meanor and grounds for dismissal.13 That statute hibernated for al-
most forty years, during which time the theory of evolution became a
staple in the curriculum of most classrooms in the United States.
In 1965, nearly forty years later, Susan Epperson, a biology
teacher at Little Rock Central High School, filed suit challenging the
constitutionality of the statute.' 4 In 1968, the Supreme Court ruled
that the statute violated the First Amendment because it "selects from
the body of knowledge a particular segment which it proscribes for the
sole reason that it is deemed to conflict with a particular religious doc-
trine; that is, with a particular interpretation of the Book of Genesis
by a particular religious group."' 5 In striking down the Arkansas
statute, the Supreme Court stated: 'The First Amendment does not
permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be tai-
lored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or
dogma."i 6
STAGE 2 - Equal Treatment
The second stage in the legislative and judicial "evolution" of Dar-
win's theory did not take forty years; it quickly followed the decision in
Epperson. Since legislators could not prohibit the teaching of evolu-
tion by statute, lawmakers sought to make sure that creationism was
given "equal treatment," by giving it the same emphasis and attention
whenever evolution theory was taught.'T The Tennessee Legislature
was again in the forefront of "evolution" legislation, passing an act
which required that whenever any textbook discussed theories of the
origins or creation of human beings, it must give "an equal amount of
10. See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 102 n.8 (1968).
11. See Bjorklun, supra note 9, at 278.
12. Ajac CODE ANN. §§ 80-1627, 80-1628 (1960)(Initiated Measure No. 1 of 1928).
13. See id.
14. State v. Epperson, 416 S.W.2d 322 (1967).
15. Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103 (1968).
16. Id. at 106.
17. See Bjorklun, supra note 9, at 278.
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emphasis on the origins and creation of man and his world as the
same is recorded in... the Genesis account in the Bible."1s
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality
of the Tennessee statute in 1975 in Daniel v. Waters.1 9 In Daniel, the
court found that the statute violated the First Amendment because it
gave a "clearly defined preferential position for the biblical version of
creation."2 0 The apparent problem with the statute's conformity to
the First Amendment was its specific reference to the Genesis account
of creation. To overcome this hurdle, a case needed to be made for the
position that the Genesis account was more than a religious belief and
that it was as "scientific" as the theory of evolution. 21
To meet this challenge, several fundamentalist Christian organiza-
tions began to promote the idea that the Genesis account is supported
by scientific data and referred to it as "creation science" or "scientific
creationism." The legislatures of two states, Arkansas and Louisiana,
accepted that idea and each state's legislature enacted a Balanced
Treatment Act in 1981.22
When "creation science" reached the federal courts, however, it
was not accepted as "science," but was deemed to be simply the ad-
vancement of religion.2 3
McLean v. Arkansas Board of Education24
In McLean, the federal district court in Arkansas applied the long-
standing "Lemon test"2 5 finding that the statute was not adopted for a
secular purpose and that it primarily advanced religion.2 6 The court
found that the creation science law was "simply and purely an effort to
introduce the biblical version of creation into the public school curric-
ula."2 7 Finding that creation science was based on the first eleven
chapters of Genesis, the court rejected the contention that "creation
science" is a science, and that "since creation-science is not science,
18. Bjorklun, supra note 9, at 278 (quoting STEPHEN R. GOLDENSTEIN AND G. GORDON
GEE, LAW AND PUBLIC EDUCATION 70 (2d ed. 1980)).
19. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
20. Id. at 489.
21. See Bjorklun, supra note 9, at 278-79.
22. See id. at 279.
23. See infra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.
24. 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).
25. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)(establishing the Establish-
ment Clause test: "First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose;
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor in-
hibits religion...; finally, the statute must not foster an excessive government
entanglement with religion.").
26. McLean, 529 F. Supp. at 1264.
27. Id. at 1272.
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the conclusion is inescapable that the only real effect of (the act) is the
advancement of religion."28
Aguillard v. Treen29
The Louisiana Balanced Treatment Act received similar treatment
by the federal courts in Louisiana. In Aguillard, the plaintiffs pre-
vailed on their motion for summary judgment because the statute had
no secular purpose and its primary effect "promotes the beliefs of some
theistic sects to the detriment of others" and thus ". . . violates the
fundamental First Amendment principle that a state must be neutral
in its treatment of religion."30 In affirming the district court, the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that "the Act violates the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment because the purpose of the statute is
to promote a religious belief."31 In June of 1987, the Supreme Court
affirmed the Fifth Circuit Court decision stating:
The Louisiana Creationism Act advances a religious doctrine by requiring ei-
ther the banishment of the theory of evolution from public school classrooms
or the presentation of a religious viewpoint that rejects evolution in its en-
tirety. The Act violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
because it seeks to employ the symbolic and financial support of government
to achieve a religious purpose.
3 2
Following the decision in Aguillard, the second stage in the travels
of the "monkey" theory came to an end. As one commentator noted,
"[sitates could neither prohibit the teaching of evolution nor could
they require creationism to be taught if evolution was covered."33
STAGE 3 - Collateral Attack
With the striking down of equal treatment legislation and the pro-
hibition against teaching creation science, one would think that issues
relating to the teaching of evolution in the schools were as dead as the
dinosaurs (except those found in Jurassic Park, of course). One should
think again! Those opposed to the teaching of the theory of evolution
in public schools have sought means of collaterally attacking the
teaching of the theory of evolution through the assertion of First
Amendment rights of instructors. The argument is based on the aca-
demic freedom of instructors to teach and express their religious be-
liefs to their students. The opponents of the theory of evolution also
rely on the assertion of First Amendment rights of the public for equal
access, by providing equal time to present creation science to students
28. Id.
29. 634 F. Supp. 426 (E.D. La. 1985).
30. Id. at 428-429.
31. Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1253 (5th Cir. 1985).
32. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 596-97 (1987).
33. Bjorklun, supra note 9, at 279.
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and encouraging legislative action to require biology books to state a
disclaimer from endorsement of the theory of evolution by the school
district.
1. Prohibiting the Teaching of Creationism or Creation Science
as Interference with the Academic Freedom Rights of
Teachers and Students
In Webster v. New Lennox School District No. 122,34 the Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether a school district
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments by prohibiting a
teacher from teaching a nonevolutionary theory of creation. In Web-
ster, a student in Ray Webster's junior high school "social studies class
complained that Mr. Webster's teaching methods violated principles of
separation between church and state."3 5 In response to the complaint,
"the New Lennox School Board. . ., through its Superintendent, ad-
vised Webster by letter that he should... refrain from advocating a
particular religious viewpoint" in his classroom instruction.3 6 Web-
ster responded by seeking further clarification, and asserting that his
discussion of religious issues was only intended to open the minds of
his students and to encourage students to explore alternative view-
points.3 7 The Superintendent then sent a letter to Webster stating
that objective discussions of the "historical relationship between
church and state were permissible when such discussions were an ap-
propriate part of the curriculum."38 However, the advocacy of a Chris-
tian viewpoint was prohibited.3 9  Additionally, Webster was
"specifically instructed not to teach creation science, because ... this
theory had been held by the federal courts to be religious advocacy."40
Webster filed suit claiming that the prohibition on teaching creation
science was censorship in violation of the First and Fourteenth
Amendments. 41
"The district court concluded that Mr. Webster did not have a first
amendment right to teach creation science in a public school."42 Sig-
nificant for school districts in dealing with such personnel matters,
the district court found that the letters between Webster and the Su-
perintendent were critical, particularly the second letter from the Su-
perintendent to Webster wherein the Superintendent "clearly
indicated exactly what conduct the school district sought to pre-
34. 917 F.2d 1004 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. Id. at 1005.
36. Id.
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scribe."43 The court noted that the wide latitude school boards have in
setting curriculum must be tempered by the limitations established by
the Constitution.44 The court stated that "the school board could not
enact a curriculum that would inject religion into the public schools.
Moreover, the school district had a responsibility to ensure that the
establishment clause was not violated."4 5 In dismissing Webster's
complaint, the district court stated:
Webster has not been prohibited from teaching any nonevolutionary theories
or from teaching anything regarding the historical relationship between
church and state. Martino's [the superintendent] letter of October 13, 1987
makes it clear that the religious advocacy of Webster's teaching is prohibited
and nothing else. Since no other constraints were placed on Webster's teach-
ing, he has no basis for his complaint and it must fail.4 6
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's
dismissal of the complaint.4 7 The circuit court rejected Webster's as-
sertion that he had a First Amendment right to determine the curricu-
lum content of his class.48 Quoting from an earlier Seventh Circuit
decision, the court said "[t]here is a compelling state interest in the
choice and adherence to a suitable curriculum for the benefit of our
young citizens and society. It cannot be left to individual teachers to
teach what they please."4 9 The compelling state interest in this case
was "to ensure that Mr. Webster did not stray from the established
curriculum by injecting religious advocacy into the classroom." 50
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision, which held that
school officials do not violate the First Amendment "'so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.'" 51
The court concluded that the prohibition on teaching creation science
to junior high school students was appropriate because of "the school
board's important pedagogical interest in establishing the curriculum
and legitimate concern with possible establishment clause
violations."5 2
In a footnote to its opinion, the Seventh Circuit noted that a stu-
dent, Matthew Dunne, was another plaintiff in Webster's initial suit




46. Id. at 1006-07 (quoting Webster v. New Lennox School Dist., 1989 WL 58209, at
*4-5 (N.D. Ill. May 25, 1989)(mem. opinion)).
47. See Webster, 917 F.2d at 1008.
48. See id. at 1007.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1007.
51. Id. at 1008 (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273
(1988)).
52. Webster, 917 F.2d at 1007.
53. See id. at 1007 n.2.
20001
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
right to receive information about creation science and prohibiting
Webster from teaching it interfered with that right. The district court
dismissed Dunne's complaint on the basis that "the school districts
compelling interest in avoiding establishment clause violations and in
protecting the First Amendment rights of other students" outweighed
Dunne's desire to obtain creation science instruction.5 4 Since Dunne
did not appeal this decision, the academic freedom rights of students
to receive creationism information were not a part of the Seventh Cir-
cuit Court decision.
2. The Theory of Evolution as a Religious Belief System,
Causing its Teaching to be a Violation of the First
Amendment's Establishment Clause
In Peloza v. Capistrano Unified School District5 5 a high school biol-
ogy teacher brought an action "challenging the school district's re-
quirement that he teach evolutionism, as well as a school district
order barring him from discussing his religious beliefs with
students."56
Peloza's complaint alleged that the school district violated the Es-
tablishment Clause
by pressuring and requiring him to teach evolutionism, a religious belief sys-
tem, as a valid scientific theory. Evolutionism, according to Peloza, "postu-
lates that the 'higher' life forms ... evolved from the 'lower' life forms... and
that life itself 'evolved' from non-living matter." It is therefore "based on the
assumption that life and the universe evolved randomly and by chance and
with no Creator involved in the process." Peloza claims that evolutionism is
not a valid scientific theory because it is based on events which "occurred in
the non-observable and non-recreatable past and hence are not subject to sci-
entific observation." Finally, in his appellate brief he alleges that the school
district is requiring him to teach evolutionism not just as a theory, but rather
as a fact.5 7
The court characterized Peloza's complaint as follows:
Charitably read, Peloza's complaint at most makes this claim: the school dis-
trict's actions establish a state-supported religion of evolutionism, or more
generally of 'secular humanism." According to Peloza's complaint, all persons
must adhere to one of two religious belief systems concerning "the origins of
life and of the universe:" evolutionism, or creationism. Thus, the school dis-
trict, in teaching evolutionism, is establishing a state-supported "religion."
We reject this claim because neither the Supreme Court, nor this circuit,
has ever held that evolutionism or secular humanism are 'religions" for Es-
tablishment Clause purposes. Indeed, both the dictionary definition of relig-
ion and the clear weight of the case law are to the contrary. The Supreme
Court has held unequivocally that while the belief in a divine creator of the
54. Id.
55. 37 F.3d 517 (9th Cir. 1993).
56. Id. at 517.
57. Id. at 520 (citations omitted).
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universe is a religious belief, the scientific theory that higher forms of life
evolved from lower forms is not.5 8
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court,
stating:
The district court dismissed [Peloza's] claim, stating "Since the evolutionist
theory is not a religion, to require an instructor to teach this theory is not a
violation of the Establishment Clause.... Evolution is a scientific theory
based on the gathering and studying of data, and modification of new data. It
is an established scientific theory which is used as the basis for many areas of
science. As scientific methods advance and become more accurate, the scien-
tific community will revise the accepted theory to a more accurate explanation
of life's origins. Plaintiffs assertion that the teaching of evolution would be a
violation of the Establishment Clause is unfounded." We agree. 5 9
As such, the court held evolution was not a religion, and its teach-
ing did not constitute a violation of the Establishment Clause of the
Constitution.
3. Free Speech and the Right of a School District to Restrict a
Teacher's Ability to Talk to Students about Religion
During Duty Hours
In Peloza, issues were also raised about whether a school district
should regulate a teacher's espousal of his or her religious beliefs to
students during duty hours, whether such action was a violation of the
teacher's rights of free speech, and whether such action was discrimi-
natory under federal law.60
Peloza claimed that "the school district instructed him to refrain
from discussing his religious beliefs with students during 'instruc-
tional time,' and to tell any students who attempted to initiate such
conversations with him to consult their parents or clergy."61 The
school district had reprimanded Peloza for inculcating his religious be-
liefs to his students. As set forth in the complaint, the reprimand
stated:
You are hereby directed to refrain from any attempt to convert students to
Christianity or initiating conversations about your religious beliefs during in-
structional time, which the District believes includes any time students are
required to be on campus as well as the time students immediately arrive for
the purposes of attending school for instruction, lunch time, and the time im-
mediately prior to students' departure after the instructional day.6 2
Peloza sought a declaration that the school district's "definition of
instructional time is too broad, and that he should be allowed to par-
ticipate in student-initiated discussions of religious matters when he
58. Id. at 521 (citations omitted).
59. Id. at 521-22 (citations omitted).
60. See id. at 522-24.
61. Id. at 522.
62. Id. (citations omitted).
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is not actually teaching class."63 The court found that "[tihe school
district's restriction on Peloza's ability to talk with students about re-
ligion during the school day is a restriction on his right of free speech,"
but found that such restriction was justified by citing U. S. Supreme
Court precedent: "'the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for
affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school offi-
cials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools."64
The court also noted:
"[T]he interest of the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation may
be [a] compelling one justifying an abridgement of free speech otherwise pro-
tected by the First Amendment .... " This principle applies in this case. The
school district's interest in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation
trumps Peloza's right to free speech.6 5
The court went on to state that:
While at the high school, whether he is in the classroom or outside of it during
contract time, Peloza is not just any ordinary citizen. He is a teacher. He is
one of those especially respected persons chosen to teach in the high school's
classroom. He is clothed with the mantle of one who imparts knowledge and
wisdom. His expressions of opinion are all the more believable because he is a
teacher. The likelihood of high school students equating his views with those
of the school is substantial. To permit him to discuss his religious beliefs with
students during school time on school grounds would violate the Establish-
ment Clause of the First Amendment. Such speech would not have a secular
purpose, would have the primary effect of advancing religion, and would en-
tangle the school with religion. In sum, it would flunk all three parts of the
test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman .... 66
4. Discrimination
In Helland v. South Bend Community School Corporation,67 a sub-
stitute teacher, Helland, sued the school district for allegedly violating
Title VII and section 1983 by removing him from a list of teachers
eligible for substitute teacher positions.68 The United States District
Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted the corporation's
motion for summary judgment. 69 Helland appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals held that "(1) teacher failed to show that corporation's proffered
reasons for its actions were pretext for discrimination in violation of
Title VII, and (2) removing teacher from list was least restrictive
63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506-07
(1969)).
65. Id. at 522 (quoting Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 394 (1993)).
66. Id. at 522 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971)).
67. 93 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. 1996).
68. See id. at 328.
69. See id.
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means of furthering compelling government interest in avoiding un-
constitutional interjection of religion into public school classrooms."7o
From May 1979 to June 1980, and again from August 1985 to November
1993, Helland worked as a substitute teacher for the South Bend Community
School Corporation. During that time, several principals and teachers for
whom he had substituted submitted negative evaluations of Helland's per-
formance and requested that he not return to their schools or classrooms. The
evaluations indicated that Helland failed to follow lesson plans left for him by
the teachers for whom he substituted and that he failed to maintain control of
his classes. One teacher complained that Helland drank a nonalcoholic beer
in class, and that the students believed it was alcoholic. Two teachers com-
mented on Helland's lack of understanding of high school students, noting an
incident where Helland gave his car keys to a student who had been sus-
pended from the school grounds. In addition, several teachers complained
that Helland proselytized in his classes by reading the Bible aloud to middle
and high school students, distributing Biblical pamphlets, and professing his
belief in the Biblical version of creation in a fifth grade science class. After the
latter incident, Helland agreed not to give the students an assignment if they
agreed not to tell anyone about the discussion.
The School Corporation warned Helland numerous times that his poor per-
formance as a substitute and his improper interjection of religion into the
classroom were grounds for removing him from the substitute teacher list.
Finally, in November 1993, it notified Helland that it no longer would hire
him as a substitute teacher because he did "not follow lesson plans, [had]
problems with classroom management and on some occasions. .. interjected
... religious-oriented materials into portions of your classroom presentation.
Helland filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days of his removal from the School
Corporation's substitute teacher list. 42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-5(e)(1). The EEOC
declined to bring an action on Helland's behalf. Helland then commenced this
lawsuit in federal court, alleging that the School Corporation discriminated
against him because of his religion in violation of Title VII, section 1983, and
RFRA71
a. Title VII and Section 1983 Claims
In response to Helland's Title VII and section 1983 claims, the Sev-
enth Circuit found Helland had no direct evidence of intentional dis-
crimination.7 2 The court then considered whether Helland had
proven that the "legitimate" reasons for the school district's actions
were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination. The
burden was on the school district to articulate a "legitimate nondis-
criminatory reason" for removing Helland from the substitute teacher
list.7 3 The court cited the two reasons given by the school district to
justify its actions:
First, it stated that it removed Helland from the substitute teacher list be-
cause his job performance had not been satisfactory. In support of this con-
70. Id. at 327.
71. Id. at 329.




tention, the School Corporation offered negative evaluations submitted by a
number of teachers who criticized Helland's failure to follow the lesson plans
the teachers left for him, and some of whom specifically requested that Hel-
land not substitute for them again. Second, the School Corporation stated
that it had dismissed Helland because he defied repeated warnings against
inteijecting his religious beliefs into the classrooms. 74
The court found both of these were legitimate nondiscriminatory
reasons for dismissing him.75
The Seventh Circuit then reviewed the evidence and found that
Helland had failed to produce evidence that the school district had a
pretext, a "lie," for discrimination.76 The court found that the admin-
istration relied upon numerous reports that provided sufficient non-
discriminatory reasons to conclude that Helland's work was below
average, and that the school district's removal of Helland was not be-
cause of his religion itself.7 7
b. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Helland's complaint also alleged that by "terminating [him] for re-
fusing to cease from carrying his Bible to work and to cease reading
his Bible in privacy during job breaks, [the school district] substan-
tially burdened [his] free exercise of religion," and therefore violated
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA).78 "Under RFRA,
the government may substantially burden a person's exercise of relig-
ion only if it demonstrates that its action furthers a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and that its action is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest."7 9
The court found that the school district had a "compelling govern-
mental interest" to prevent the teaching of religion in public schools:
Helland appropriately "does not dispute that there is a compelling govern-
mental interest against teaching religion in public schools." Indeed the Con-
stitution requires governmental agencies to see that state-supported activity
is not used for religious indoctrination .... Thus, the issue for us is whether
removing Helland from the substitute teacher list was the least restrictive
means of furthering the school district's compelling governmental interest.8 0
Helland also contended that the school district infringed on his
right to carry his Bible to work and to read the Bible in privacy during
job breaks. The court found no merit in this part of Helland's
complaint:
What the school district frowned upon was not Helland's carrying the Bible to
work and reading it in privacy, but his reading the Bible aloud to students and




78. Id. at 330; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (b) (1994).
80. Helland, 93 F.3d at 331 (citations omitted).
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discussing religion during class, in contravention not only of the Constitution,
but also of the lesson plans left for him. A school can direct a teacher to "re-
frain from expressions of religious viewpoints in the classroom and like set-
tings." And in fact the School Corporation has a constitutional duty to make
"certain, given the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate
religion."8 1
5. Providing Creation Science Supporters Equal Time to Present
Theories on the Origin of Life to Students
The ruling of the Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard8 2 estab-
lished the rule of law that school districts in the United States are to
follow regarding the teaching of creationism or creation science in the
public schools of the land.8 3
81. Id. at 331 (citations omitted).
82. 482 U.S. 578 (1987).
83. See id. at 589-91. The Supreme Court summarized the line of decisions that set
the parameters for religious inculcation in the public schools:
Stone v. Graham invalidated the State's requirement that the Ten Com-
mandments be posted in public classrooms. "The Ten Commandments
are undeniably a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no
legislative recitation of a supposed secular purpose can blind us to that
fact." 449 U.S. at 41, 101 S. Ct. at 194. As a result, the contention that
the law was designed to provide instruction on a 'fundamental legal
code" was "not sufficient to avoid conflict with the First Amendment."
Ibid. Similarly Abington School Dist. v. Schempp held unconstitutional a
statute "requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school
day of verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer
by the students in unison," despite the proffer of such secular purposes
as the 'promotion of moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic
trends of our times, the perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching
of literature." 374 U.S. at 223, 83 S. Ct. at 1572.
As in Stone and Abington, we need not be blind in this case to the
legislature's preeminent religious purpose in enacting this statute.
There is a historic and contemporaneous link between the teachings of
certain religious denominations and the teaching of evolution. It was
this link that concerned the Court in Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
89 S. Ct. 266, 21 L. Ed.2d 228 (1968) which also involved a facial chal-
lenge to a statute regulating the teaching of evolution. In that case, the
Court reviewed an Arkansas statute that made it unlawful for an in-
structor to teach evolution or to use a textbook that referred to this sci-
entific theory. Although the Arkansas antievolution law did not
explicitly state its predominant religious purpose, the Court could not
ignore that "[the statute was a product of the upsurge of fundamentalist
[internal quotations omitted] religious fervor" that has long viewed this
particular scientific theory as contradicting the literal interpretation of
the Bible. Id., 393 U.S., at 98, 106-107, 89 S. Ct. at 267, 271-272. After
reviewing the history of antievolution statutes, the Court determined
that 'there can be no doubt that the motivation for the [Arkansas] law
was the same [as other anti-evolution statutes]: to suppress the teaching
of a theory which, it was thought, denied [internal quotations omitted]
the divine creation of man." Id. at 109, 89 S. Ct., at 273. The Court
found that there can be no legitimate state interest in protecting particu-
lar religions from scientific views "distasteful to them," id., at 107, 89 S.
Ct., at 272 (citation omitted), and concluded "that the First Amendment
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As one commentator noted:
Religious fundamentalists over the years have attempted to introduce crea-
tionism or creation science in public school classrooms in order to counterbal-
ance the teaching of evolution. In light of Aguillard, attempts disguised as
balanced treatment acts appear doomed under the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment. The Aguillard court and other courts have looked be-
yond an expressed secular purpose for balanced treatment acts. Courts have
taken into consideration the religious pronouncements of sponsors of the bill
and key witnesses, the source of such bills (such as the major creation-science
centers nationwide), as well as other legislative history. Courts then used
such information to strike down equal time or balanced treatment laws as
impermissible advancement of religion in violation of the secular purpose
prong of the Lemon neutrality test.8 4
Creationists argue that creation science can be taught in the class-
room without biblical reference because it is based on scientific data.
However, as noted by Schaeffer, based on a study of the basic tenets of
creation-science, the data relied upon is inherently religious and un-
substantiated scientifically.55 With the line of authority cited in
Aguillard prohibiting the "balanced treatment" approach, to avoid vio-
lation of the Establishment Clause, it would appear that school dis-
tricts may not arrange for, sanction, support, or promote presenta-
tions by third parties to students of creationism or creation science,
either during the school day or after school hours. School districts
may, if they have created an open forum, be required to allow the use
of school facilities, during nonschool hours by those who wish to make
presentations regarding religious issues.
6. Equal Access to Public Facilities to Present a Program on the
Origin of Life
In Pfeifer v. City of West Allis86 an action was brought under sec-
tion 1983 to challenge the city's refusal to allow the plaintiff to use a
meeting room in the public library to present a program on creation-
ism. Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court,
held that: "(1) library's meeting room was a designated public forum
for First Amendment purposes, and (2) city's refusal to allow plaintiff
to use a meeting room in the public library to present a program on
creationism violated his rights under the First and Fourteenth
Amendments."8 7
does not permit the State to require that teaching and learning must be
tailored to the principles or prohibitions of any religious sect or dogma,"
id. at 106, 89 S. Ct. at 271.
Edwards, 482 U.S. at 589-91.
84. Sherri Schaeffer, Edwards v. Aguillard Creation Science and Evolution - The
Fall of Balanced Treatment Acts in the Public Schools, 25 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 829,
855 (1988).
85. See id.
86. 91 F. Supp.2d 1253 (E.D. Wis. 2000).
87. Id. at 1253.
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The court first considered the applicable law on the issue of
whether the First Amendment entitled Pfiefer to use the public li-
brary for his program on creationism. It found the following legal ten-
ets to be applicable:
1. A governmental body is subject to the constraints of the First
Amendment.88
2. The extent to which a person may engage in expressive activity
on government property is determined by whether the prop-
erty is a "public forum."89
3. "Limitations . . . on classes of speech vary depending upon
whether the relevant forum is determined to be a traditional
open forum, a public forum created by government designation
or a nonpublic forum."90
4. Traditional public forums where government constraint on ex-
pression is severely limited have been found to be streets,
parks, and other traditional public facilities for the expression
of ideas and opinions.91
5. "Reasonable content-neutral time, place and manner restric-
tions are permissible in a traditional public forum."92
6. "A designated public forum consists of public property that the
state has opened for use by the public as a place for expressive
activity and is created by the governmental entity opening a
nontraditional site for expressive activity."93
7. "Unlike a traditional public forum, the dedication of a desig-
nated public forum may be revoked" by the governmental
entity.94
8. A designated public forum can be created for a limited purpose
such as:
A. Use by certain groups;
B. Discussion of certain subjects; and the subject matter can
be limited in accordance with the character of the forum,
e.g., and is called a "limited public forum."95
9. Restrictions on speech in a limited public forum are subject to
strict scrutiny and regulations of speech in that the forum
must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.9 6











10. Nonpublic forums are public property that is neither a tradi-
tional nor dedicated public forum; they are not open to the gen-
eral public. "In a nonpublic forum courts give great weight to
the government's desire to preserve the property for its in-
tended, usually limited, use. Regulation of speech in a non-
public forum can be based on subject matter and speaker
identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in
light of the purpose served by the form and are viewpoint
neutral."9 7
The court noted that the rules governing public and nonpublic fo-
rums are "intended to strike a balance between the interest in free
speech and the countervailing interest in efficient operation of govern-
ment."9 8 In Pfiefer's case, the court looked to the policy and practice of
the city to ascertain whether it intended to designate the room that
Pfiefer requested for his presentation to be open to assembly and de-
bate as a public forum. The court noted that a governmental entity, by
affirmative action, can transform a nonpublic forum into a public fo-
rum by permitting a wide variety of persons or groups to hold meet-
ings in such facilities. 9 9
In applying these principles, the court held that the most relevant
factor is the governmental entity's "intent" as exemplified by the na-
ture of the property and its compatibility with the expressive activity
sought. The second relevant factor is the "extent of use granted." 0 0
Pfiefer had requested the Constitution Room in the library. The li-
brary's policies allowed the room to be used for public programs spon-
sored by nonprofit educational and cultural agencies, and encouraged
availability of the room to local community organizations. The court
found that "community" included the neighborhood and the public,
and those included groups with a religious message. The court also
looked at the wide variety of groups whose applications to use the
room were approved. The court then considered whether the room
was compatible with the expressive activity, e.g, whether the room use
was consistent with oral communication. 10 1
Finally, the court noted that Pfiefer was denied use of the Consti-
tution Room because his presentation was religious in nature. In find-
ing that the city was not justified in denying Pfiefer use of the room,
the court stated:
Because the library granted access to a wide variety of nonreligious private
organizations, . . . there is no "realistic danger that the community would
97. Id. at 1259.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1259-60.
100. Id. at 1261.
101. See id. at 1265.
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think that the [Library] was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and
any benefit to religion or the Church would have been incidental."
1 0 2
School districts should apply the criteria set forth in Pfiefer to de-
termine if they have created a dedicated public forum, or transformed
their facilities, or a portion thereof, into a public forum or limited pub-
lic forum when confronted with persons who wish to make presenta-
tions with religious content, including presentations on creation
science.
7. The "Scientific Theory of Evolution Disclaimer" Policy
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, in Freiler v. Tangipahoa
Parish Board of Education,L03 decided the constitutionality of a school
board policy which required teachers to disclaim any endorsement of
the theory of evolution by the school district before teaching it. In
Freiler, parents of public school students brought an action against a
parish school board and its individual members, challenging the con-
stitutionality of the board's resolution and seeking injunctive and de-
claratory relief. The district court held that the board's resolution,
requiring teachers to disclaim the board's endorsement of the theory
of evolution, was passed for religious reasons and had the effect of en-
dorsing religion in violation of the Establishment Clause. The Sev-
enth Circuit's opinion cited the exact language of the disclaimer:
On April 19, 1994, the School Board adopted the following resolution,
which shall be referred to as "the disclaimer":
Whenever, in classes of elementary or high school, the scientific theory of
evolution is to be presented, whether from textbook, workbook, pamphlet,
other written material, or oral presentation, the following statement shall be
quoted immediately before the unit of study begins as a disclaimer from en-
dorsement of such theory.
It is hereby recognized by the Tangipahoa Board of Education, that the
lesson to be presented, regarding the origin of life and matter, is known as the
Scientific Theory of Evolution and should be presented to inform students of
the scientific concept and not intended to influence or dissuade the Biblical
version of Creation or any other concept.
It is further recognized by the Board of Education that it is the basic right
and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion or maintain beliefs
taught by parents on this very important matter of the origin of life and mat-
ter. Students are urged to exercise critical thinking and gather all informa-
tion possible and closely examine each alternative toward forming an
opinion.
1 0 4
The plaintiffs challenged the disclaimer based upon the First Amend-
ment to the United States Constitution, which states that:
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof' and on the basis of Article 1, § 8 of the
Louisiana Constitution, which states that "No law shall be enacted respecting
102. Id. at 1264.




an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The is-
sue presented [to the Court was] whether the disclaimer violated the Estab-
lishment Clause. 1 0 5
The court started its analysis by finding that the prohibitions con-
tained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution were
rendered applicable to the states in the Fourteenth Amendment. The
court then stated:
There is a plethora of jurisprudence interpreting this clause. While there
have been decisions which have not named it specifically, the decision in
Lemon v. Kurtzman... enunciated the seminal method of analysis (dubbed
the Lemon test) to be employed when determining whether governmental ac-
tion runs afoul of the Establishment Clause, as follows:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative
criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be
gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster "an excessive govern-
ment entanglement with religion". . . . If the proposed legislation does not
satisfy each of these prongs, it violates the Establishment Clause. 1 0 6
The court went on to find that, in order to satisfy the first prong of
the Lemon test, the resolution must have a secular legislative pur-
pose, noting:
The Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard .... studied the legislative pur-
pose underlying the passage by the Louisiana Legislature of the "Balanced
Treatment for Creation-Science and Evolution-Science in Public School In-
struction" Act (Creationism Act). The Edwards Court analyzed both the offi-
cial stated purpose and the motivations behind the promulgation of the
statute, as evidenced by the discussion of the legislative sponsor and other
legislators, to determine the true purpose. The Court explained:
A governmental intention to promote religion is clear when the State enacts a
law to serve a religious purpose. This intention may be evidenced by promo-
tion of religion in general [citation omitted], or by advancement of a particular
religious belief [citation omitted]. If the law was enacted for the purpose of
endorsing religion, "no consideration of the second or third criteria [of Lemon]
is necessary." 1
0 7
The court then discussed the rationale of the Supreme Court:
[The Supreme Court] has been particularly vigilant in monitoring compliance
with the Establishment Clause in elementary and secondary schools. Fami-
lies entrust public schools with the education of their children, but condition
their trust on the understanding that the classroom will not purposely be used
to advance religious views that may conflict with the private beliefs of the
student and his or her family. Students in such institutions are impressiona-
ble and their attendance is involuntary.108
In finding that the disclaimer resolution mandated by the School
Board was unconstitutional, the court stated:
105. Id. at 824-25 (citations omitted).
106. Id. at 824-25.
107. Id. at 826 (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985)).
108. Id. at 826 (citing Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987)).
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As hard as it tries to, this Court cannot glean any secular purpose to this
disclaimer. While the School Board intelligently suggests that the purpose of
the disclaimer is to urge students to exercise their critical thinking skills,
there can be little doubt that students already had that right and are so urged
in every class. The School Board also stresses that the point is that the teach-
ers advise the students that they have the right to form their own opinions or
maintain the beliefs taught to them by parents or in Sunday School on the
origin of life. This Court can hardly conceive that students do not already
have that right, or are unaware that they have it, or conversely, in its absence,
that teachers in Tangipahoa Parish public schools teach students that they do
not have the right to believe in Divine Creation, if they so choose. As the
Wallace Court recognized, if there is no clearly secular purpose to the act, the
Court is left with but two conclusions: (1) the act was enacted for religious
purposes, or to convey a message of endorsement of religion; or (2) the act had
no purpose. In the absence of a finding that the School Board passed a mean-
ingless or irrational resolution, the Court must find that the disclaimer was
passed for religious reasons. A review of all of the evidence presented leaves
little doubt that the reasons for the adoption of the resolution were religious.
Even the School Board acknowledges the religious underpinnings of the dis-
claimer, if somewhat indirectly. It states in its Trial Brief that the "School
Board approved the resolution as a means of responding to the sensibilities
and sensitivities of a diverse, pluralistic student population and their parents"
and as "a disclaimer from an official orthodoxy concerning a controversial
topic upon which many hold strong but differing opinions." These "sensibili-
ties and sensitivities" are religious ones, however, because they relate to the
espousal of parents and students of religion, "the expression of man's belief in
and reverence for a superhuman power recognized as the creator and governor
of the universe." What offends parents, students, and School Board members
about the teaching of evolution, and the reasons which underlay the Creation
Science proponents, is that the teaching of the scientific theory of evolution in
public schools is not accompanied by the theory, indeed the belief, that a Su-
preme Being was the designer and creator of humankind. 1 0 9
The plaintiffs in Freiler petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari. That petition was denied on June 19,
2000, but went down fighting. In dissenting from the denial of certio-
rari, Justice Scalia, who was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Thomas, opined that the Fifth Circuit erroneously applied the
Lemon test in a manner "so erroneous as independently to merit the
granting of certiorari, if not summary reversal."110 Scalia notes that
under the second prong of the Lemon test, the "principal and primary
effect of state action must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion.""' Scalia then states:
Far from advancing religion, the "principal or primary effect" of the disclaimer
at issue here is merely to advance freedom of thought. At the outset it is worth
noting that the theory of evolution is the only theory taught in the Tangipahoa
Parish schools. As the introductory paragraph of the resolution suggests, the
disclaimer operates merely as a (perhaps not too believable) "disclaimer from
endorsement" of that single theory, and not as an affirmative endorsement of
any particular religious theory as to the origin of life, or even of religious theo-
109. Id. at 829.
110. Tangipahoa Parish Bd. of Educ. v. Herb, 120 S. Ct. 2706, 2708 (2000).
111. Id. at 2708.
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ries as to the origin of life generally. The only allusion to religion in the entire
disclaimer is a reference to the "Biblical version of Creation," mentioned as an
illustrative example-surely the most obvious example-of a "concept" that
teaching of evolution was not "intended to influence or dissuade."1 1 2
Justice Scalia asserts that the disclaimer merely affirms "the basic
right and privilege of each student to form his/her own opinion," main-
tain their own beliefs, and encourages students to closely examine
each alternative before forming an opinion.1 1 3 In his concluding para-
graph Justice Scalia aptly summarizes the state of the law today, and
recognizes that the "Monkey Business Continues .... :"
In Epperson v. Arkansas,... we invalidated a statute that forbade the teach-
ing of evolution in public schools; in Edwards v. Aguillard,... we invalidated
a statute that required the teaching of creationism whenever evolution was
also taught; today we permit a Court of Appeals to push the much beloved
secular legend of the Monkey Trial one step further. We stand by in silence
while a deeply divided Fifth Circuit bars a school district from even sug-
gesting to students that other theories besides evolution-including, but not
limited to, the Biblical theory of creation-are worthy of their consideration. I
dissent. 1 1 4
THE CONCLUSION
In the play and movie "Inherit the Wind," Matthew Harrison
Brady (William Jennings Bryan) is at a rally in support of his prosecu-
tion of the young teacher (Thomas Scopes). At the rally a fundamen-
talist minister is railing against those who do not accept the literal
reading of the Bible, stating that all evolutionists are condemned to
eternal damnation, including his daughter's fianc6, the young teacher
(Scopes). To soothe the preacher, Bryan quoted Proverbs: "He who
brings trouble on his family will inherit only the wind, and the fool
will be the servant to the wise."' 1 5
At the end of the play, Henry Drummond (Clarence Darrow), in
fighting to allow schools to teach the theory of evolution, cites Brady's
quoting of this verse as the moral of the trial: One who forces his ideas
of how things are upon others, without allowing them to think for
themselves, shall "inherit the wind." After seventy-five years, the
pendulum has swung to the other extreme, with Justice Scalia opining
that the disclaimer in Freiler only encourages freedom to consider the-
ories of the origin of life other than the theory of evolution. The con-
test over whose ideas will be presented to the public school children of
our land remains a significant issue. Schools must be vigilant to pro-
tect their curriculums from violations of the Establishment Clause
while allowing for free expression of ideas at appropriate times in ap-
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. Id. at 2709 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
115. Proverbs 11:29.
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propriate places. As that most famous American philosopher Yogi
Berra said, "It ain't over 'til it's over." The struggle to address the
teaching of the origin of life on our tiny blue planet "ain't over;" the
monkey business continues ....
